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Chapter One
Same Sex Marriage and Constitutional Law

On February 24, 2004, President George W. Bush called for a federal
constitutional amendment that would define a marriage in the United States as one man
and one woman, husband and wife. The President’s call was a response to several years
of debate and legislation over marriage in the U.S. Seemingly endless legislation
regarding same sex marriage has been fervently debated at the federal and state level for
several years.1 During the Presidential election, state-by-state votes on the amendment
were sponsored by the Republican Party.
As a result of the proposed amendments, same sex marriage has taken its place
among the top campaign issues, next to abortion and the death penalty, as a consideration
for voters at the polls. If voters endorse same sex marriage, they will rarely support a
candidate who opposes it.2 Opinions on same sex marriage are considered an ideological
dividing line between “red” and “blue” states. Campaign-focused arguments about the
future of same sex marriage have exploded since the last Presidential election.
Questions arise about the constitutionality of the proposals as the arguments about
same sex marriage increase and policy makers react to that discourse. Will an anti-same
sex marriage amendment be added to the Federal Constitution? Could such an
amendment hold in court? Many of the 2004 amendments to state constitutions were

1

Charles E. Mauney Jr., “Landmark Decision or Limited Precedent: Does Lawrence v. Texas Require
Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Same Sex Marriage?” Cumberland Law Review 35 (2005): 147.
2
Katherine M. Franke, “Sexuality and Marriage: The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics,” Columbia
Journal of Gender and the Law 15 (2006): 236.
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responses to Hawaii’s and Massachusetts’ decisions to allow same sex marriages.3 While
some states have made steps towards legalization, the results have been minimal. The
Hawaii Legislature has recently reversed its court decision to allow same sex marriage
and Massachusetts same sex marriage contracts have been declared null and void by the
governor of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts cases will be heard in the Federal
Supreme Court within the next two years and these cases will likely be the battle ground
for a Federal decision on same sex marriage.4
How will this decision be made? As the amount of social, religious, political and
strategic arguments surrounding same sex marriage grows, campaign-focused policy
decisions increase. How will the Supreme Court separate the code of law from the
politically motivated propaganda, if at all? Furthermore, what will the winning argument
look like? While much of the discourse surrounding same sex marriage is social and
religious in nature, I focus solely on the legal aspects of the debate. This thesis answers
the question, “What might a sound legal argument for same sex marriage look like?” In
order to answer this question effectively, this thesis focuses on several elements of the
debate. In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of the aspects of constitutional law
most relevant to my thesis. This chapter discusses the Equal Protection and Due Process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the meaning of liberty in relation to these
clauses. My argument relies heavily on these concepts and applies them to existing
precedent to construct a legal rationale for same sex marriage. The first of these
constitutional themes is the Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses.
3

The Hawaii State Supreme Court ruled in favor of same sex marriage in the case of Baehr v. Lewin in
1996. The Massachusetts State Supreme Court followed in 2002.
4
Goodridge, et. al. v. Department of Public Health, et. al.(2003).
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Part One: The Fourteenth Amendment
In order to understand a legal argument for same sex marriage, it is first necessary
to determine what constitutional elements form the argument. The Fourteenth
Amendment is an important part of the same sex marriage debate, as it is in my argument.
Proposed by the thirty-ninth congress and ratified on June 13, 1868, the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to protect racial minorities, specifically African-Americans,
from race-based discrimination.5 It states,
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.6
The amendment is composed of several parts, called clauses. Two of these clauses are
essential to my argument. They are the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause.

The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause is made up of the section of the Fourteenth
Amendment which reads, “…nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” While the first uses of the Equal Protection Clause were
primarily focused on racial discrimination, it has developed historically and is now
considered the constitutional test for any form of discrimination, race-based or

5

Lee Epstein and Thomas G. Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America (Washington: CQ Press,
2000) 614.
6
Constitution of the United States of America. USCS Const. Amend. 14, § 1
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otherwise.7 Currently, US courts recognize three methods for applying the Equal
Protection Clause in a case of suspected unlawful discrimination.8
The first of these methods is the “rational relation” standard for judicial review.
This standard places a heavy burden of proof on the petitioner to demonstrate that the
state’s policy in question exercises an irrational amount of discrimination. The state must
merely demonstrate that the statute in question is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest. This test is the easiest for the state to pass. However, the burden of
proof gets heavier as the standard of review changes.
The second method for determining if a statute is discriminatory is the
“heightened scrutiny” method of review. This intermediate level of scrutiny was
articulated by the Court in United States v. Virginia when it identified that the state must
have an exceedingly persuasive justification for the law and demonstrate that at least the
challenged classification serves important governmental objectives. This standard has
traditionally been applied to gender-based classification, but has been applied in cases
which addressed anti-miscegenation laws like Loving v. Virginia.
Finally, the “strict scrutiny” standard of judicial review is applied to certain
classes of discrimination which the court identifies as “suspect classes.” Traditionally,
these are claims of discrimination based on race or national origin. This standard of
review places a heavy burden of proof on the state. A law which receives this standard of
review is considered unconstitutional unless the state can demonstrate that the

7

Epstein and Walker, 617.
Epstein and Walker, 614-621. This selection of text informs the following section regarding the levels of
scrutiny used in the application of the Equal Protection Clause.

8
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discrimination is substantially related and necessary for the accomplishment of a
permissibly state objective, or a compelling state interest.
The strict scrutiny standard determines whether a group is a suspect class using a
three-tired test. The group in question must be a discrete and insular minority, with a
history of discrimination. Next, advocates must demonstrate that the group is defined by
an immutable characteristic, and finally, the group must have disproportionately limited
access to political power. These tiers of the strict scrutiny standard are difficult to define
and are therefore frequently debated. “Applying such criteria is difficult and has given
rise to sharp divisions of opinion among the justices” of the Supreme Court.9
In addition to the three-tired test for suspect classification, strict scrutiny can be
granted in cases involving the violation of a fundamental right. For example, any statute
which prohibits freedom of speech would likely be granted strict scrutiny, regardless of
the race of the petitioner, because freedom of speech is a fundamental right. Because this
kind of scrutiny does not consider minority status, arguing that a violation of a
fundamental right has taken place can be a strategic way to avoid demonstrating the three
tiers of the test for suspect classification. I think it is difficult, if not impossible, to
demonstrate that sexual orientation is a suspect classification using the three tiered test.
Therefore, I argue that a fundamental right is violated when same sex couples are denied
a marriage contract. My argument, presented in chapter four, relies heavily on the Due
Process Clause but utilizes equal protection claims as well.
The Equal Protection Clause acts as a guideline for the Court and is open to many
interpretations. How does a court determine if a group is based on an immutable
characteristic, like skin color? What makes a state’s interest compelling, as opposed to
9

Epstein and Walker, 616.
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important? What makes a right fundamental? These questions are highly contestable. A
decision to apply one method of scrutiny over another is far from arbitrary, however. In
fact, the standard of scrutiny applied will most likely determine the decision of the court
in future same sex marriage cases. For this reason, the method of scrutiny applied to a
case is a crucial determining factor of the decision.

The Due Process Clause
The Equal Protection Clause is not the only constitutional consideration in the
legal question of same sex marriage. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment has a role in the discussion as well. The Due Process Clause reads, “…nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”10 While straightforward, the Due Process Clause raises many questions. Questions
of definition abound. What is “liberty?” What counts as “property?” And, of course, what
is “due process of law?”
Due process has been defined in both procedural and theoretical terms. In
reference to procedure, due process means the “course of legal proceedings according to
rules and principles established in our system of jurisprudence for protection and
enforcement of private rights.”11 In other words, procedural due process is the process
which is due to each citizen when he or she is confronted with the law. This includes the
right to a fair trial, the reading of Miranda rights and other legal procedures.
My argument concerns the more abstract definition of due process, known as
substantive due process. “‘Due process of law’ which the Fourteenth Amendment exacts

10
11

Constitution of the United States of America. USCS Const. Amend. 14, § 1
Scott v McNeal, 154 US 34, 38 L Ed 896, 14 S Ct. 1108, 1894.

8

from states is a conception of fundamental justice, and is not satisfied by mere formal
correctness, nor is it confined by any absolute rule.”12 And so, there is more substance to
due process than simply procedure.
Substantive due process deals directly with the fundamental rights which
guarantee strict scrutiny protection. “Due process of law is summarized as a
constitutional guaranty of respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of nation as to be ranked as fundamental or are implicit in
concept of ordered liberty.”13 This means that the Due Process Clause protects
fundamental rights. It follows that any violation of a fundamental right is a violation of
the Due Process Clause. Because I argue the fundamental right to marry is violated when
same sex couples cannot be married, I also argue that there is a violation of the Due
Process Clause, or a substantive due process violation.
Such a violation can come in many forms. The Due Process Clause “provides
heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights
and liberty interests.”14 It protects life, liberty and property; important fundamental rights.
While life and property deserve fervent protection, my argument is most concerned with
the concept of liberty. In order to fully understand the substantive due process violation
in my argument, it is necessary to understand two forms of liberty, positive and negative.

12

Foster v Illinois, 332 US 134, 91 L Ed 1955, 67 S Ct 1716, 1947.
Rochin v California, 342 US 165, 96 L Ed 183, 72 S Ct 205, 25 ALR2d 1396, 1952.
14
Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 138 L Ed 2d 772, 117 S Ct 2258, 97 CDOS 5008, 97, 1997.
13
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Part Two: The Two Sides of Liberty
Liberty was a national value before our nation was a nation.15 It is, in the simplest
of descriptions, fundamental. However concrete its role is in our nation’s democracy, the
definition of “liberty” is highly flexible. It is a term which plays many roles in our
government and code of law without having a clear definition. For the purpose of my
argument, I require a two part definition of “liberty.” The idea that there are two kinds of
liberty was functional in the Founding of the nation, although it was not outwardly
acknowledged. Today, two terms are used to describe the two kinds of liberty. Those
terms are “positive” and “negative” liberty.
The two-part definition of “liberty” describes the relationship between the
individual and the government, be it state or federal. In essence, the terms “negative” and
“positive” describe the role of the government in the life of the citizen and the actions of
the citizen in relationship to the government. What results are two kinds of liberty; one
includes privacy and the other includes recognition.

Negative Liberty and the Right to Privacy
Negative liberty is a conception of liberty which limits the role of government in
its citizens’ lives. The liberties which compose this category were developed as early as
the Founding. They are in the “freedom from” category, which includes the freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure and cruel and unusual punishment. Also included among
the negative liberties is the right refuse to harbor soldiers during wartime. While different

15

Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist No. 1,” The Origins of the American Constitution, ed. Michael
Kammen (New York: Penguin, 1986) 126. “…of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics
the greatest number have begun their career, by paying an obsequious court to the people, commencing
Demagogues and ending Tyrants.”
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in magnitude and topic, these freedoms share a common theme: the government must
stay out of certain fundamental aspects of the lives of its citizens. In other words, the
relation between the government and its people is negative; there is no government
involvement beyond legislating to limit the role of government.16
While many of the cornerstone negative liberties were articulated at the dawn of
this nation, others have developed as the nation’s history has progressed. The right to
privacy is one such new liberty. “The assertion that the law should recognize a right to
privacy originated in an 1890 law review essay by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
calling for ‘a general right to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and sensations.’”17 Privacy
was introduced as a constitutional concept in contraception cases during the 1960’s.
Among these are Eisenstadt v. Baird and Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965. While these
cases concerned an idea of privacy different than the privacy torts that Warren and
Brandeis defended, the concept of limited government intrusion is consistent within both
ideas of privacy. Griswold will be discussed further in chapter three, though a discussion
of the right to privacy is necessary here.
The right to privacy was directly associated with marriage and intimate
relationships early in its development as a constitutional concept. In Eisenstadt, Justice
William Brennan stated, “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwanted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a

16

Michael Kammen, introduction, The Origins of the American Constitution, (New York: Penguin, 1986)
ix. “[Political liberty]… meant freedom of action so long as it was not detrimental to others.”
17
William N. Eskridge Jr. And Nan D. Hunter, Sexuality, Gender and the Law (New York: Foundation
Press, 2004) 9.
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child.”18 Clearly, the right to privacy is a negative liberty; a right which is respected when
the government does not act, or intrude, in the lives of its citizens.
The right to privacy has expanded to include other “matters so fundamentally
affecting a person,” like sexual conduct. In the case of Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the
Court overturned a previous ruling, Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), and ruled against state
regulation of same sex sexual behavior. Once again, the government was kept from
intruding, quite literally, into the private bedrooms of it citizens.
One of the most useful examples of negative liberty is the right to choose to
terminate a pregnancy. Since Roe v. Wade (1971), the government has been obligated to
stay out of the private choices of women during the first six months of pregnancy. The
right to choose is a negative liberty, and stems from the right to privacy articulated in
cases like Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) and Griswold (1962).
Over time, the right to privacy has developed into a hodgepodge of rights, most
associated with private relationships. Because privacy was not originally articulated as a
fundamental liberty, its importance and mere existence is contested. Critics, like Robert
Bork, have argued that the right to privacy is never outwardly articulated in the
Constitution, nor is there any history of legislative intent to develop a right to privacy.19
Regardless, the right to privacy is now firmly rooted in case precedent. “The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that one aspect of liberty afforded constitutional protection
under the Due Process Clause is the right of privacy.”20 It has taken its place among our

18

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 31 L. Ed.2d 349. 1972.
Robert Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some first Amendment Problems,” Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971):
8-9.
20
JoLynn M. Schlichting. “Minnesota’s Proposed Same Sex Marriage: A Flamingly Unconstitutional
Violation of Full Faith and Credit, Due Process and Equal Protection.” William Mitchell Law Review 31
(2005): 1649.
19
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negative liberties. Among the category of negative liberties, privacy is most essential to
my argument for same sex marriage.
Negative liberty is only half of the two-part definition of “liberty”. The concept of
positive liberty is also necessary for a rigorous argument in favor of same sex marriage.
Positive liberty is the opposite of negative liberty; as opposed to protecting privacy,
positive liberties are guaranteed government actions.

Positive Liberty and Recognition
Since the Founding of the United States, United States citizens have been entitled
to certain things. This concept of “freedom to” liberties is at the core of civil rights and is
what separates democracy from fascism. Foundational positive liberties are those actions
in which citizens are free to engage without government punishment.
Positive liberty is not reserved solely for the citizen, however. The government,
too, must act. Both government and citizen are inactive when negative liberties are
concerned (the citizen does not have to do certain things for the government and the
government is prohibited from requesting certain things of its citizens). Contrarily,
positive liberty imposes obligation on the government. These obligations of the state to
its citizens can be financial, as is the case with Social Security and tax refunds. Other
positive obligations include access to polling places to facilitate the right to vote. Most
pertinent to my argument, however, is the obligation of the state to recognize some
intimate relationships as marital. The case of Loving v. Virginia (1967) was the first
significant Supreme Court case involving recognition of a marriage. This case, and its
relationship to my argument, will be discussed in following chapters.

13

A legal argument for same sex marriage can come in many forms. Indeed, when
one has an objective in mind, the Constitution can appear as a tool for achieving that
objective. Many have chosen the tools of civil rights, others one of equal protection,
while still others view same sex marriage as an issue of federalism and the rights of
individual states.
While there are many ways to construct the case for same sex marriage, some are
more straightforward than others. I aim to piece the constitutional issues together to form
a fairly simple and cohesive line of reasoning that legitimizes same sex marriage. This
thesis applies the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, with a foundation of case
precedent, to the question of same sex marriage and concludes that same sex marriage
should be legal in the United States. The foundational constitutional themes have been
review in this chapter. In the next chapter, I examine the literature which currently shapes
the same sex marriage debate and demonstrate the necessity for an un-biased and
comprehensive legal argument. I describe the case law which contributes to my argument
in chapter three of this thesis. Finally, in chapter four, I demonstrate that the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution requires equal distribution of the liberties associated with
the fundamental right to marry. My argument is based on case precedent and current legal
scholarship and is formulated as a comprehensive Fourteenth Amendment argument for
same sex marriage. This thesis places itself in a body of scholarship which is composed
of contradictory and incomplete perspectives. These perspectives are discussed in the
following chapter.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review

The amount of scholarly or popular literature produced to address same sex
marriage has increased dramatically over the past several years. This is due for the most
part to the case of Lawrence v. Texas in the legal field and Republican attempts to amend
the Constitution in the political field.
Because the question of same sex marriage indirectly relates to almost every other
issue of law and politics, the literature which discusses same sex marriage touches on
many debates. Aspects of the same sex marriage debate lead to questions about religion,
federalism, interstate commerce and adoption law, among others. The literature that
discusses civil rights, equal protection, liberty and due process most concerns my thesis.
This literature is equally varied. While there are predictable arguments from the radical
Christian right which argue that same sex marriage violates traditional family values,21
and far-left arguments which support same sex marriage from the standpoint of civil
rights,22 there are other, less politically-split qualities of the discussion. This chapter
reviews the scholarly and popular literature surrounding the same sex marriage debate
and demonstrates that an un-biased and comprehensive legal argument is necessary. My
argument is unique for this reason. This thesis is significant because it brings together
many aspects of constitutional law, presenting a more complete, legal argument. Virtually
none of the literature herein reviewed attempts this. The body of literature into which my
argument fits is vast, and includes many debates on its fringes.
21

The Gay Agenda: Gay Marriage, film, The Report Multi-Media Resource Center, 1993.
Brenda Feigen, “Same Sex Marriage: An Issue of Constitutional Rights, Not Moral Opinions,” Harvard
Women’s Law Journal 27 (2004): 345.
22
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The perspectives of queer theorists are among the less conventional arguments
surrounding same sex marriage. Many of these scholars, including Paula Ettelbrick, are
against same sex marriage. The fringe of the debate also includes the arguments of
conservative academics like Andrew Sullivan, who supports gay marriage for its
promotion of a conservative social institution. These arguments in the same sex marriage
discussion run against the grain of the conventional socio-political sides of the debate.
Still, one theme unites the many sides of the same sex marriage discussion in terms of
civil rights and discrimination. That is the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment plays a direct or indirect role in the civil rights and
discrimination discussion of same sex marriage. Regardless of the overall thesis of the
argument (for or against same sex marriage), an approach to the Equal Protection Clause
or the Due Process Clause is developed, with or without intention. In many cases, both
clauses are addressed.
Indeed, almost every argument that attempts to approach the law and its
relationship to same sex marriage inevitably argues for either rational basis, heightened
or strict scrutiny legal analysis. For example, it would be contradictory and counterproductive to support the suspect classification of homosexuals (thereby granting them
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause) while simultaneously arguing against
same sex marriage. The method of scrutiny supported by the author, therefore, can be
inferred by the argument made.
For this reason, the standards of scrutiny applied by the Court in Fourteenth
Amendment cases are an effective way to organize the literature surrounding the same
sex marriage debate. The first group of arguments reviewed herein utilizes the rational

16

relation test, which places a heavy burden of proof on those in favor of same sex
marriage and does not support homosexuals as a protected class. While this standard of
review appears to support an argument against same sex marriage, paradoxically, some
perspectives argue otherwise. In the first section of this review, I demonstrate how these
arguments (those for and against same sex marriage) conflict and do not lead to the
clarification of the question of scrutiny. It follows that they do not develop clear, legally
applicable arguments.
Those arguments that support heightened scrutiny are equally confusing. In the
second section of this review, I discuss those arguments which lend support to the
heightened scrutiny standard of review. This standard has traditionally been applied to
gender-based classification. The arguments which support this standard come from all
sides of the political spectrum. Among them are the perspectives of radical feminists and
queer theorists. While some of these arguments support gay marriage, others argue
against it. Much of the inconsistency within these arguments stems from disagreement
within the gay and lesbian community over how the gay rights movement should
approach same sex marriage and the assimilation it implies. While valid and interesting,
this lack of continuity within the community further confuses the practical application of
gay rights arguments to a legal analysis of the same sex marriage issue. The
inconsistency within the gay community infringes upon a consistent argument for
heightened scrutiny because the argument relies on the nature of same sex relationships
and, in order to be effective, must be applicable to all.
Similarly, disagreement over the nature of gay and lesbian identity impedes a
unified argument for strict scrutiny. In the third section of this review, I will examine the

17

arguments which support strict scrutiny, the standard of review which protects minorities
under a “suspect classification.” Suspect classification is a category that has traditionally
been reserved for those discriminated against based on race. This categorization raises
many questions regarding the nature of homosexuality itself. While some argue that
identifying one’s self as gay man or a lesbian is an expression of an immutable
characteristic, an expression of identity23 others believe that gay and lesbian identity is
defined by the act of gay or lesbian conduct, or sex. “The conduct-centered view holds
that what a person does determines what she is; the status-centered view argues that her
sexuality is so central to her identity that what she is exists independently of what she
does.”24 Among those in the “identity camp,” the endorsement of same sex marriage is
split. On the other side, those that support an act-based classification are, for the most
part (sometimes unintentionally), against the classification of gay men and lesbians as a
suspect class. This does not mean, however, that these arguments do not support same
sex marriage. The possible existence of a gay gene and the implications of such a
discovery for both sides of the acts/identity debate pose the possibility that while identity
appears to be the clear path to suspect classification, it may not necessarily lead to same
sex marriage.25
Indeed, organizing the same sex marriage debate using the Equal Protection
Clause demonstrates a lack of consistency within the debate. This organization
demonstrates that there are many “sides” to this argument. It is necessary for a practical,

23

Allyson Albert, “Irreconcilable Differences? A Constitutional Analysis as to Why the United States
Should Follow Canada’s Lead and Allow Same Sex Marriage,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 30
(2005): 547.
24
Nan D. Hunter, “Life After Hardwick,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 27 (1992): 531
25
Robert Alan Brookey, Reinventing the Male Homosexual: The Rhetoric and Power of the Gay Gene
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002). 118-148.
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legal analysis of the issue, however, to analyze how the foundational themes of these
arguments relate to the law, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment. Such an analysis
demonstrates the lack of any solely legal argument for or against same sex marriage. The
following sections present the body of literature surrounding the same sex marriage
debate. The sections are organized by method of scrutiny. The first of these is the rational
relation standard.

Part One: Arguments for Rational Relation Standard
The rational relation standard of judicial review challenges gay men or lesbians to
demonstrate that the questionable discrimination against them is not rationally related to
the goals of the state. In most cases discussed herein, those goals are to limit the rights of
same sex couples, which I do not consider a legitimate state interest. This standard of
scrutiny places the burden of proof on the petitioner to make such a demonstration.
Oddly, the prevailing precedent which supports the rational relation test for sexual
orientation is a case in which the petitioners won, despite their burden of proof. That case
is Romer v. Evans, decided in 1993.
Romer considered a Colorado state constitutional amendment which barred the
classification of homosexuals as a group to be protected from discrimination. The Court
ruled against Colorado. The holding described a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
based on the rational basis test for judicial review. This case contributes a great deal to
the question of classifying of homosexuals as a protected group. In applying the rational
relation test for judicial review, the Court determined that “a bare desire to harm a

19

politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.26 The
Court ruled against the statute on the ground that it was self defeating; in preventing the
classification of homosexuals, the state of Colorado classified them as a group not
available for classification. While the decision is limited in its scope, the majority opinion
demonstrates that the Court is becoming more sensitive to gay and lesbian rights and that
those rights can be protected under a rational relations test.
Romer demonstrates that the application of the Equal Protection Clause through
the rational relation test can result in a decision in favor of gay and lesbian rights. Such a
precedent lends a great deal to those who support same sex marriage but do not consider
the question of same sex marriage from a civil rights perspective. One such argument is
made by Andrew Sullivan.27 Sullivan describes a conservative argument in support of
same sex marriage. His reasoning is based primarily of the value of the emotional and
financial stability of the marriage commitment. Sullivan argues that, just as it is for
heterosexuals, marriage promotes conservative values in the gay and lesbian community.
Because these values are, according to Sullivan, beneficial to society, as many
individuals as possible should be allowed to marry. Sullivan argues that the state should
treat same sex and heterosexual couples as equal. This claim is most supportive of a
rational relation standard of review, the standard which does not make a clear distinction
between the majority and minority.
Sullivan may not understand, however, that his argument agrees with that of
politically conservative homophobic activists. Sullivan’s argument does not present a
clear legal path to same sex marriage. If any legal analysis can be derived, it is an
26

Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620, 116 S. Ct. 1996.
Andrew Sullivan, “Virtually Normal,” Same Sex Marriage, the Moral and Legal Debate, ed. Robert M.
Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum (Amherst NY, Prometheus Books, 1997) 67.
27
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endorsement of a standard that places a heavy burden of proof on same sex couples.
While Sullivan’s conservative values may promote his perspective well in the political
arena, they hinder any legal argument he makes. By inadvertently endorsing the rational
relation standard, Sullivan (a gay man) includes himself among other conservatives who
do not endorse same sex marriage. This group includes Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the
Supreme Court’s most conservative Justices.
In his dissent in Romer, Justice Scalia describes his support for Amendment 2, the
Colorado Amendment to classify homosexuals as a group not entitled to constitutional
protection. Scalia refuses to designate homosexuals as a class because the group itself
does not pass the test for suspect classification. Scalia argues that homosexuality is not an
immutable characteristic but a lifestyle choice and that the gay rights movement
demonstrates that gays have ample (if not disproportionate) access to political power.
Failure on two of the three tiers of the test for suspect classification does not warrant the
protection of homosexuals as a class, according to Scalia.
Because he does not entitle gay men and lesbians constitutional protection as a
suspect class, Scalia’s argument supports the application of the rational relation test to
questions involving discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Indeed, Scalia
argues that Colorado had a legitimate interest in “denying special protections to
homosexual conduct or to persons with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in
such conduct.”28 Both Scalia and Sullivan, therefore, argue that sexual orientation is not a
characteristic which defines a person as a member of a group deserving protection in the
eyes of the law. Sullivan argues for assimilation and acceptance, however, while Scalia
advocates ignorance and limited representation. With a more in-depth understanding of
28
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how these two arguments relate to the future application of the Equal Protection Clause,
both types of rational relation supporters could (indeed, should) transform their limited
perspectives into arguments which can challenge not only the opposition but one another.

Part Two: Arguments for Heightened Scrutiny
The arguments which support the heightened scrutiny standard of review are
equally limited in scope and are difficult to apply to a future same sex marriage decision.
The debate over heightened scrutiny in sexual orientation discrimination cases does not
result in a clear course of action on the issue of same sex marriage. Paula Ettelbrick’s
article, “Since when is Marriage a Path to Liberation?” illustrates this point well29.
Ettelbrick claims that “marriage runs contrary to two of the primary goals of the lesbian
and gay movement: the affirmation of gay identity and culture and the validation of many
forms of relationships.” Her argument has two parts; first, that the insistence that gays
and lesbians be treated as identical to married couples runs contrary to the drives of the
queer movement- to resist the idea that the norm is heterosexuality. Second, Ettelbrick
argues that to embrace same sex marriage is, in a sense, to abandon the ideals of equal
rights for women. Her argument relies in part on the assumptions that heterosexual
marriage is an institution which discriminates against women and that the queer
movement, in resisting heterosexual marriage, supports those women who are in
oppressive heterosexual relationships. Ettelbrick places the responsibility of protecting all
marginal groups (women, people of color and the poor) with the queer movement and
gay rights activists.
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Ettelbrick does not support same sex marriage. However, she does indirectly
support a standard of scrutiny which could make same sex marriage more likely than,
say, the rational relation standard.30 Ettelbrick makes a connection between homosexuals
and women. Because the heightened scrutiny standard is concerned with gender
discrimination, this connection could grant homosexuals heightened scrutiny by arguing
that the primary goal of the queer movement is to represent marginalized groups
(especially women) and that queer opposition to marriage speaks directly on behalf of
women in oppressive marriages. That standard would strengthen the burden of proof
placed on the state, making the possibility of same sex marriage nearer to a reality.
Considering these implications, it is difficult to place the radical feminist and queer
argument into a practical legal context, despite the importance of these perspectives.
Diane Miller attempts to contextualize Ettelbricks perspective in her book The
Freedom to Differ: the Shaping of the Gay and Lesbian Struggle for Civil Rights. Miller
disagrees with Ettelbrick and, consequently and inadvertently, weakens the heightened
scrutiny argument. While Miller recognizes that the gay rights movement and radical
feminism do intersect in some respects, she claims that “on other occasions, the two
groups have worked with a complete disregard for each other or even at crosspurposes.”31 The claim that the gay rights movement directly relates to women’s rights is
therefore one that, at best, can only be applied at certain times and to certain individuals.
Such a specific relationship is unlikely to sufficiently warrant a heightened scrutiny
claim.
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Disagreement over the importance of resistance to assimilation exists within the
gay rights movement. According to Miller, there is a “spectrum of possibilities, bounded
on one end by absolute separatism and on the other end by the goal of complete
assimilation.”32 Ettelbrick falls on the separatist end of that spectrum. Because of the lack
of continuity across the gay rights movement, only a portion of the group supports
Ettelbrick’s claim and, consequently, heightened scrutiny. While these inconsistencies are
acceptable when applied to the debate in any other context, a strong legal argument
requires universal application.
David J. Mayo and Martin Gunderson address the shortcomings of Ettelbrick’s
argument in their article, “The Right to Marriage, a Critique of the Leftist Critique,”
published in the Journal of Social Philosophy. Mayo and Gunderson describe effectively
the radical feminist critique and liberal gay rights critique of same sex marriage. The
article dismisses these perspectives for several reasons. First, Mayo and Gunderson assert
that same sex marriage may break down gender stereotypes, not strengthen them. Citing
Nan Hunter’s “Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry,” Mayo and Gunderson
cite the unlikely possibility that same sex marriages would oppress women specifically,
in fact, it would likely be quite the contrary. Next, ironically, the article addresses the
queer perspective and dismisses it under a justification of Equal Protection. Mayo and
Gunderson claim that civil rights should always trump policy considerations. Ettelbrick’s
argument supports the withholding of civil rights from a marginalized group to the
benefit of others. While Ettelbrick admits that “when analyzed from the standpoint of
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civil rights, certainly lesbians and gay men should have the right to marry,”33 she places
the policy considerations of the queer movement above these civil rights.
The differing perspectives regarding the relationship between the gay rights
movement in the women’s movement must be compromised in order to develop a clear
argument for heightened scrutiny. While Ettelbrick, Miller, Mayo and Gunderson do not
agree on the implications of such a relationship, they acknowledge that the relationship
does exist. That relationship could be crucial for a practical legal application of the
heightened scrutiny test.

Part Three: Suspect Classification, Identity Formation and Strict Scrutiny
Unlike heightened scrutiny, strict scrutiny places the burden of proof on the
shoulders of the state. This standard of review, traditionally applied to race-related cases
of discrimination, promises a clear path towards same sex marriage, according to some of
its proponents. However, prior to 1993, this standard had never been applied to a case of
sexual orientation discrimination.
Baehr v. Lewin (1993) marked a change in states application of the Equal
Protection Clause to same sex marriage. For the first time, a state supreme court plurality
in Hawaii determined that strict scrutiny should be applied to the states denial of marriage
to same sex couples. The court did not, however, directly apply the standard. Instead, it
remanded the case back to a lower court for further determination of the “compelling
interest” (if any) of the state. The lower court could not find a compelling interest of the
state and the case was referred back to the state supreme court. There, the decision was
finalized. Later, the Hawaii legislature passed laws which trumped the court ruling. Still,
33
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Baehr remains among the few cases addressing same sex marriage in light of the Equal
Protection Clause and the strict scrutiny standard.
Allyson Albert endorses the strict scrutiny standard in her article, “Irreconcilable
Differences? A Constitutional Analysis as to Why the United States Should Follow
Canada's Lead and Allow Same-Sex Marriage.” Albert seeks to establish that the US
Supreme Court should raise the level of judicial review afforded to homosexuals in
analysis of the Equal Protection Clause. Albert draws a comparison between the
decisions of the Canadian Court to allow same sex marriage in Halpern v. Toronto.34 The
Court made the argument that keeping homosexuals from the institution of marriage
constituted a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Albert argues
that the Canadian Court’s constitutional analysis in Halpern can and should inform the
decision of the US Court to consider homosexuals as a class to be protected. Part Three
of the article provides a background of the Equal Protection Clause and the methods of
judicial review used to apply it. This section also provides a relevant discussion of Romer
and Lawrence. In Part Four, Albert supports of the use of strict scrutiny for cases
involving discrimination based on sexual orientation and the classification of
homosexuals as a suspect class, like race. Albert addresses the history of discrimination,
immutability and political powerlessness requirements for suspect classification.
In determining the immutability of homosexuality, Albert outlines an important
debate which informs the immutability distinction. It is the debate between acts and
identity conceptions of homosexuality.
The immutability of homosexuality depends upon the definition of
“homosexuality”, Albert asserts. Homosexuality is not immutable if it is defined in the
34
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manner which Justice Antonin Scalia defines it; a manner which is based primarily on the
act of homosexual sex, something which is entirely voluntary. In contrast, Albert
describes how the Canadian Court recognizes the influence of genetics on homosexuality;
making it a non-voluntary, immutable characteristic. Similarly, Brenda Feigen argues in
support of same sex marriage and homosexual immutability. She bases her argument
primarily on her condemnation of the acts-based perspective, which determines
homosexual identity by one’s actions first and foremost. Whether or not homosexuality is
seen as immutable by the Court greatly affects the level of scrutiny applied.
While Albert and Feigen argue in support of immutability as the path to legalized
same sex marriage, Robert Alan Brookey believes otherwise. In Reinventing the Male
Homosexual, the Rhetoric and Power of the Gay Gene, Brookey describes the legal and
political implications of the “gay gene.” Most scholars, like Albert and Feigen, assert that
the gay gene would provide uncontestable evidence for the immutability of homosexual
identity, strengthening the case for strict scrutiny. Indeed, if sexual orientation were
immutable, like race, it would be protected as a suspect class. However, Brookey
describes how the existence of a gay gene (and other evidence of immutability) could
provide more of a weapon for opponents of same sex marriage than has been predicted by
such speculators as Albert and Feigen.35
Brookey draws an analogy to the classification of homosexuality as a mental
disorder to illustrate his point. When homosexuality was so classified, gay rights activists
were outraged. Their response to the classification was that their lifestyle was not an
illness, but a rational choice. Brookey, in a sense, connects the Scalia “lifestyle choice”
argument to gay activists. How, then, will the activist argument proceed if the gay gene is
35

Brookey, 140-148.

27

discovered? Brookey describes how, just as the classification of homosexuality as a
mental disorder did, the discovery of a gay gene will likely strengthen attempts to “cure”
or “treat” homosexuality- thereby weakening the gay rights movement. At the same time,
however, the gay gene will undoubtedly strengthen the immutability aspect of suspect
classification.
The gay gene is problematic in the same sex marriage debate because it provides
simultaneous support for both sides. Brookey describes the unpredictability of a court
decision when the gay gene is involved. Indeed, the classification of homosexuals as a
suspect class may not, in fact, support the conclusion that same sex marriage follows.
Brookey makes clear that, despite the apparent simplicity of the necessary arguments, the
gay gene does not provide the clear and resounding support for suspect classification
many have argued. Thus, The Equal Protection Clause does not in fact provide a clear
solution to the problem.
The intricacies of the Equal Protection Clause do not provide a clear solution to
the legal argument but allow for a workable structure within which the debate can be
framed. In presenting the sides of this argument through their implications on a future
legal decision, one can see where these perspectives lack practical legal application or
consistency. While some argue for the legalization of same sex marriage, they
inadvertently support the rational relation standard. On the other hand, by associating the
gay rights movement with women’s rights, some anti-same sex marriage perspectives are
contradictory. Finally, despite the promise of the gay gene to the pro-same sex marriage
side of the immutability debate, this “golden ticket” to suspect classification may be more
trouble than it’s worth.
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My research seeks to prevent these problems of legal application by, frankly,
avoiding them altogether. My argument is based initially on substantive due process and
touches on equal protection only after the violation of a fundamental right is established.
Effectively, my argument nullifies the acts and identity debate by maintaining a universal
approach to identity and conduct through a discussion of liberty, both positive and
negative.
My argument separates legal analysis from moral issues like the acts and identity
debate. Still, there is one relationship between ethics and legal analysis necessary to my
argument. Ethics and law converge at the concept of fundamental rights. The Court uses
two standards by which to judge a fundamental right. In order for a liberty interest to be
considered fundamental, it must be either “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and
tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”36 The legal issues involved in
the same sex marriage question, therefore, turn on what constitutes a fundamental right,
as does my argument. While my argument is focused primarily on questions that arise
after the establishment of a fundamental right, the definition of such rights is a moral as
well as historical issue. For this reason, the arguments discussed in this chapter actively
contribute to a legal analysis of the same sex marriage question.
With the moral and historical foundation of the legal concepts established, I move
to a strictly legal analysis of the issue. As I have demonstrated in this chapter, combining
ethical and legal argument produces inconsistent and ineffective legal analysis. My
argument presents a less problematic line of reasoning towards the legalization of same
sex marriage. This line of reasoning is based on existing case precedent which develops
the argument for same sex marriage. These cases are described in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three
Relevant Case Law

Case law acts as a foundation for every legal argument. In order to construct a
solid argument for same sex marriage, I present a review of the case law relevant to my
argument. Those cases most relevant to my argument are those that address issues of
equal protection and due process, both found in the Fourteenth Amendment. I will apply
these cases to my argument in support of gay marriage in the next chapter.
The following cases contribute to my argument in several ways. First, Meyer,
Pierce and Skinner establish the fundamental right to marry, and clarify that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects this right. Second, Griswold establishes an element of
negative liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Third, the cases of Loving, Zablocki and Turner establish an element of positive liberty in
the fundamental right to marry. Finally, Lawrence v. Texas demonstrates that many of
these cases apply to same sex relationships.
This chapter reviews the facts, issues and holdings of eight Supreme Court
decisions between 1923 and 2003. I have chosen these cases because they represent the
broader body of case law surrounding the question of same sex marriage. The cases are
organized chronologically. As time has progressed, the Court’s attitude towards the
Fourteenth Amendment has evolved. The Court has developed increasingly specific
methods and rationales for approaching the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause.
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In the early years of the twentieth century, the focus of Fourteenth Amendment
decisions was mainly on the Equal Protection Clause in cases like Meyer v. Nebraska,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Skinner v. Oklahoma. In 1965, Supreme Court rulings
involving the right to marry changed. With Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court’s focus
moved from equal protection to due process, mainly the right to privacy. The cases which
followed Griswold also emphasized due process and privacy but moved further towards a
more positive role of the state in recognizing certain marriages. With the cases of Loving
v. Virginia, Zablocki v. Redhail and Turner v. Safley, the Court has developed a line of
precedent which indicates that there is not only a right to marry and to keep one’s married
life private, but a right to marry whom one chooses, and to have that marriage recognized
by the state.

Part One: Early Equal Protection Cases: Establishing the Fundamental Right to
Marry
Demonstrating the existence of the fundamental right to marry provides the first
step towards an effective Fourteenth Amendment argument for same sex marriage. The
following cases were decided early in the history of Supreme Court cases addressing
marriage. They articulate that the right to marry is indeed fundamental to the freedom and
liberty of U.S. citizens.

Meyer v. State of Nebraska (1923)
Meyer v. Nebraska articulated the fundamental right to marry first. In 1908,
Meyer was a bilingual school teacher interested in sharing his knowledge of the German
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language with his students. By teaching one of his students, a ten year old boy, how to
speak German Meyer violated a Nebraska state law which forbade the teaching of any
language other than English to a child who had not passed the eighth grade. Meyer
challenged the law on the grounds that it was an invasion of liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The case was argued before the Supreme Court in 1923. In his opinion for the
majority, Justice James McReynolds articulated the constitutional question before the
Court, “…whether the statute as constructed and applied unreasonably infringes the
liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment.”37 The Court
decided that the statue was unreasonable and ruled in favor of Meyer. In their decision,
the majority asserted several important claims about the Fourteenth Amendment which
are relevant to the gay marriage question.
McReynolds argued that several of the liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment have been definitely stated by the Court. He wrote, “…without a doubt, [the
Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children…”38 This
statement possibly establishes the right to marry as one of the liberties guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution. While it can be argued that McReynolds’ comments are mere dicta,
the substantial precedent supporting the fundamental right to marry indicates that
McReynolds comments play a larger role in the body of case law.
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Furthermore, McReynolds asserts that “this liberty may not be interfered with
under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or
without reasonable relation to some purpose.”39 This opinion demonstrates that the
Constitution and the Court protect the right to marry. It is unclear, however, whether the
“right to marry” indicates a right to marry whoever one wishes, including members of the
same sex. Indeed, the “common occupations of life” to which McReynolds refers
certainly did not include same sex marriage, especially not in 1923. Meyer raises more
questions than it provides answers. It is a step towards developing a more specific
description of the rights protected by of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters; Pierce v. Hill Military Academy (1925)
In the Meyer opinion, McReynolds establishes the foundation of a series of cases
which elaborate on his list of liberties. One such case is Pierce v. Society of Sisters. In
1922, Oregon passed the Compulsory Education Act which required every student in
Oregon to attend public school, with few exceptions. After a rapid decline in enrollment,
loss of revenue and several broken contracts with teachers and parents, the Society of
Sisters and Hill Military Academy filed a petition to stop the act before the loss of
business caused their private schools to close.
The decision of the Court, written by Justice McReynolds, reiterated the Meyer
decision. The case related to parents’ ability to choose the education of their children, a
protected liberty, which Meyer established. In addition, the Society of Sisters decision
articulated some interesting points about the Equal Protection Clause. First, McReynolds
established that “a law which increases the uniformity of the application of the law
39
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cannot by any stretch of the imagination be classed as a law which denies the equal
protection of the law.”40 This means that perfection need not be achieved in order for a
law to be constitutional. If it merely attempts to expand equal access to liberty, a statute
cannot violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The flexibility of the law becomes clearly applicable to the question of same sex
marriage when McReynolds elaborates, “The right to the equal protection of the laws is
not denied when it is apparent that the same law or course of procedure is applicable to
every other person in the State under similar circumstances and conditions.”41 In other
words, the Equal Protection Clause does not require that each and every person be
granted access to the same rights and liberties. Only people “under similar circumstances
and conditions” were required to share the same rights. The specification of “similar
circumstances and conditions” could easily be interpreted to protect all other people in
the State who have the same sexual orientation as the petitioner in question. Society of
Sisters provides an ambiguous impact on the gay marriage question. On one hand, the
Society of Sisters decision reinforced the Meyer language while, on the other hand, it
articulated an exceptional condition in which an equal protection claim can not be made.

Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942)
The Court began to clarify much of the ambiguity surrounding equal protections
claims with Skinner. Skinner challenged an Oklahoma criminal sterilization act. The
Oklahoma law required mandatory sterilization of those repeatedly convicted of a “felony
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involving moral turpitude.”42 Such felonies, as defined by the act, included theft but
excluded embezzlement. Skinner, charged with his third felony theft, claimed that the
Oklahoma law was an undue exercise of police power and violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court ruled unanimously in his favor,
the opinion written by Justice William Douglas, articulated a different opinion. Douglas
argued that the Equal Protection Clause had been violated.
Douglas explained that the crimes of theft and embezzlement are of the same
nature and “they are punishable in the same manner,” both as felonies.43 One violates the
Equal Protection Clause when sterilization is imposed inequitably. The Court “does not
prevent the legislature from recognizing ‘degrees of evil,’” nor does it constrain the
legislature “in the exercise of its police power to ignore experience which marks a class
of offenders or a family of offenses for special treatment.”44 Douglas made clear that the
Equal Protection Clause gives the legislature the power and right to impose limitations
upon some groups and not others. However, he articulates an important exception which
is crucial to the question of same sex marriage.
The Douglas opinion classifies the right to marry as fundamental. Douglas says,
“…the instant legislation runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, though we give
Oklahoma that large deference which the rule of the forgoing cases requires. We are
dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race.”45 Douglas explains that, when such an important right is violated, the Equal
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Protection Clause has as much relevance “as if [the law] had selected a particular race or
nationality for oppressive treatment.”46 Despite its deference to the legislature, the Court
is obligated to protect the “basic civil rights of man.” Douglas includes marriage among
these fundamental rights.
In his Skinner opinion, Douglas establishes a loophole of sorts for those seeking
equal protection of the law. Where once the clause was reserved solely for claims of
racial or ethnic discrimination, it became available for those citizens whose fundamental
rights had been violated. Skinner established an alternative route to equal protection. If
one cannot make a case for suspect classification, there is still opportunity for
constitutional protection if the petitioner can demonstrate that a fundamental right has
been violated. In order to argue for same sex marriage, then, it is necessary to argue that
the fundamental right to marry has been withheld from gay men and lesbians.

Part Two: Due Process Cases: A Shift from Privacy to Recognition, Negative to
Positive Liberty
Fourteenth Amendment cases address the Equal Protection Clause and the Due
Process Clause. Cases involving the Due Process Clause have evolved alongside equal
protection cases. The Court’s definition of “due process” has matured since Griswold v.
Connecticut in 1965, a case which defined privacy as an important element of due
process. Since Griswold, due process has grown to mean more than the negative liberty
of privacy. The cases of Loving, Turner and Zablocki gradually developed an
interpretation of due process which included positive liberties, like state recognition, for
such rights as the right to marry.
46
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Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
In addition to the equal protection of fundamental rights, the right to privacy has
an important role to play in the case for same sex marriage. The right to privacy was first
significantly clarified in Griswold v. Connecticut. Griswold involved a Connecticut
statute that made use contraceptive use a criminal offense. The executive and medical
directors of Planned Parenthood were charged for providing birth control to several
Connecticut married couples. When faced with the decision as to whether or not the
statute violated of the Constitution, the Court ruled in favor of the Planned Parenthood
directors.
The constitutional question before the Court, according to the majority opinion
written by Justice Douglas, was whether or not the use of birth control within a marriage
was protected under the penumbra of rights referred to as the right to privacy. Douglas
demonstrated using support from Society of Sisters and Meyer, that marriage is included
in the right to privacy.
While Douglas and the dissenters, Justice Hugo Black and Justice Potter Stewart,
considered the right to privacy at the heart of the constitutional question before the Court,
Justice Arthur Goldberg’s concurrence focused on the Ninth Amendment. Goldberg
described how “the language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the
Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights,
protected from government infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights
specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments.”47 Among these additional rights is
the right to privacy, according to Goldberg.
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The influence of Goldberg’s concurrence extended beyond the right to privacy,
however. He explained that “[the Ninth Amendment] was proffered to quiet expressed
fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover
all essential rights and that the mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial
that others were protected.”48 Goldberg described how the Founders intended the Ninth
Amendment to act as a reminder that not all essential rights are articulated in the
Constitution. According to Goldberg, the “rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise
a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically
protected”49 and they are thus protected under the Ninth Amendment.
While this additional protection of the right to marry seems promising to the case
for gay marriage, Justice Goldberg added several comments at the end of his concurrence
which virtually negate such an application of his words. In reference to the state’s interest
in discouraging questionable moral behavior in marriage, Goldberg wrote, “adultery,
homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State forbids… but the
intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the
institution of marriage… it is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid
extra-marital sexuality… or to say who may marry, but it is quite another… to regulate…
the details of that intimacy.”50
Even if Goldberg did not intend his discussion of the Ninth Amendment to apply
to homosexual relationships, the Griswold opinion provides a turning point for cases
involving the right to marry. The Court “linked the negative rights of individuals not to
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be interfered with by the state to the existence of the institution of marriage.”51 Griswold
effectively shifts the duty of the state from one of equal application of the laws to a duty
to respect the privacy of marriage. This shift towards due process and away from equal
protection continued after Griswold with the cases of Loving v. Virginia, Zablocki v.
Redhail and Turner v. Safely.

Loving v. Virginia (1967)
Loving v. Virginia involved a Virginia antimiscegenation statute which punished
an interracial couple by banishing them from the state. The Lovings challenged the statue
on the grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court ruled in favor of
the Lovings.
The Loving majority opinion discussed equal application. “Loving, however, is
also an important due process case because the Court for the first time addressed the
significance of the marital relationship from the perspective of due process in the absence
of considerations of privacy and the right to be left alone.”52 Unlike the claimants in
Griswold, the Lovings did not request that the state of Virginia remove itself from the
regulation of marriage. Quite the contrary, the issue in Loving was one of recognition.
Because the state of Virginia did not recognize the marriage of some couples, the
Lovings argued that their fundamental right to marry had been violated.
Virginia argued that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
because both individuals of different races were punished with equal stringency. A
similar argument could be made for anti-gay marriage statutes, that both homosexual and
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heterosexual people are barred from marrying someone of the same gender. However,
Justice Warren described that “the fact of equal application does not immunize the statute
from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has
traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race.”53 Therefore, if sexual
orientation can be classified alongside race, the argument for equal application falls apart
in much the same way it did in Loving.
The impact of Loving v. Virginia on the case for same sex marriage is three-fold.
First, Loving demonstrates that equal application no longer justifies inequitable
distribution of a fundamental right. Second, Loving adds an element of action to the state
duties required by the Due Process Clause. “The liberty protected by the due process
clause in the context of marriage goes beyond privacy concerns” and towards a focus on
recognition by the state.54 The state is not only obligated to leave private relationships
alone, but to recognize some of them as marital. Finally, Loving establishes that “the
failure of the state to [recognize certain marriages] can constitute a violation of the
fundamental right to marry.”55 Loving emphasizes the duty of the state to recognize
marriage as an element of due process. Zablocki v. Redhail has a similar focus.

Zablocki v. Redhail (1978)
Zablocki v. Redhail involved a statute which required certain Wisconsin residents
to obtain a court order in order to marry within the state. Under the statute, individuals
paying child support could not obtain a marriage license if they owed any of their
support. Furthermore, these citizens needed to demonstrate their ability to continue
53
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paying support regularly. Redhail was responsible for his illegitimate daughter and had
not fulfilled his financial obligations to the child’s mother for several years. Because the
statute denied him the right to marry, Redhail filed a complaint on behalf of himself and
the entire class of Wisconsin residents who had been refused a marriage license. He
challenged the statute on the grounds that it denied the right to marry guaranteed by the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court ruled in favor of Redhail. In his majority opinion, Justice Thurgood
Marshall elaborated on the fundamental quality of the right to marry. Because a
fundamental right was violated, Marshall indicated “‘critical examination of the state
interest is required.”56 Since Skinner, the violation of a fundamental right had been
granted strict scrutiny by the Court. Marshall contributed further to this precedent in the
Zablocki opinion. He described, “When a statutory classification significantly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by
sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests.”57
Marshall’s opinion makes clear that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right to marry. This right is supported by the right to privacy and should be
defended with strict scrutiny when threatened. These strong statements, however, leave
one important question unanswered in terms of same sex marriage. If anti-gay marriage
statutes are passed, do they “significantly interfere” with the fundamental right to marry
sufficiently to impose strict scrutiny to the analysis? Considering the future direction of
the Courts’ due process analysis, the answer could likely be “yes.”
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Whereas a “significant interference” was traditionally interpreted to mean the
state standing between individuals and the rights granted to them by the Constitution,
Loving marked a new interpretation by shifting the focus of due process from negative
liberty to positive liberty. “The constitutional problem in Zablocki was not what the state
did in terms of actions…but in terms of its omission, that is, its refusal to recognize the
plaintiff’s relationship as marital.”58 The constitutional question was not one of
interference, but one of omission. Still, the Court ruled that the state’s impact was
“significant” and unconstitutional.
The Zablocki ruling strengthens the Loving ruling. If Loving were merely an equal
protection case, the Zablocki ruling would not make sense. Zablocki indicates that “if we
view the right to marry only in terms of negative liberty… we are unable to explain fully
the kind of affirmative obligation of recognition that the state is under as a result of the
Court’s ruling in Zablocki.”59 Even if the state does not interfere with the private issues
of intimate relationships, Zablocki ruled that the state is limited in its ability to be
indifferent toward at least some relationships. Whether or the state is obligated to
recognize same sex relationships is debatable. The imposition of the Due Process Clause
on the state to recognize at least some intimate relationships as marital is further
established in the case of Turner v. Safley.

Turner v. Safely (1987)
Turner v. Safley involved a Missouri statute which limited the marriages of
inmates in Missouri prisons. The statute allowed only for marriages which had approval
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by the warden of the prison. Most of the inmates whose marriages were approved had
illegitimate children with their future spouse. The state argued that the statute was a
necessary regulation to prevent “love triangles” and encourage the rehabilitation of
female offenders.60 The Court questioned whether these objectives were rationally related
to the infringement on the fundamental right to marry.
The opinion by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor held that “the Missouri marriage
regulation was facially infirm as infringing upon the fundamental constitutional right to
marry, because the regulation was not reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.”61 In other words, the Missouri statute did not pass the test because the
infringement of the right to marry was unjustified.
Turner advances the precedent towards positive liberty considerations. The case
sheds light on the question of same sex marriage because it “is the case that most clearly
supports the proposition that the state has a due process obligation to recognize at least
some relationships as marital.” Also, Turner raises a question of equal application and
“whether the state, once it recognizes some relationships as marital, has an equality-based
obligation to recognize others in that way.”62 No questions of equal protection arise in
Turner, nor are there considerations of privacy. It only requires the state to recognize
some relationships as marital.
More so than any other case, Turner is concerned with recognition of
relationships, not restrictions on the regulation of relationships. O’Connor notes that
many important aspect of the marital relationship are unaffected by incarceration.
“Inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support and public
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commitment. These elements are an important and significant aspect of the marital
relationship.”63 Turner solidifies the obligation of the state to play a role in these
elements of marriage, if only because “civil marriage… cannot exist in the absence of
state recognition.”64
An analysis of Turner within the body of case law brings one to the question,
“Are same sex relationships included under these liberties protected by the Court?”
O’Connor’s comments on the importance of emotional support and public commitment to
intimate relationships demonstrate a historical progression of the Court. At least several
justices are beginning to see intimate relationships in terms of emotional bonds and
commitment. Lawrence v. Texas demonstrates that this newly developing attitude
considers same sex relationships.

Lawrence v. Texas (1997)
Lawrence involved the conviction of two men for “consensual sexual intimacy”
under a Texas statute which made “deviant sexual intercourse” a crime.65 While Bowers
v. Hardwick ruled that such statues were constitutional in 1986, the Court held that the
statute violated the Due Process Clause and overruled Bowers in 2003 with Lawrence v.
Texas.
Lawrence involved a Texas statute that made sexual conduct between people of
the same sex illegal. Two men, Lawrence and Garner, violated the statute. The Court held
that “the statute… sought to control a personal relationship that was within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals,” and that “the statute furthered no
63
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legitimate state interest which could justify the statute’s intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual.”66 The ruling emphasized the right to choose one’s private,
sexual conduct in the privacy of the home, emphasizing the prior rulings on privacy in
Society of Sisters, Meyer and Griswold.
The Lawrence opinion contributes to the emerging focus on due process, instead
of equal protection, in cases involving the right to privacy and same sex conduct. In his
opinion for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy describes how cases like Baird v.
Eisenstadt and Roe v. Wade have demonstrated that the protection of sexual privacy
found in Griswold is not limited to married adults.67 Kennedy emphasizes that the
question at hand is not whether “the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy”68 but whether the right to privacy established by
such cases as Griswold is violated when such behavior is criminalized.69
While Kennedy applied an expansive and forceful interpretation of the Due
Process Clause, Justice O’Connor argued that the case involved a question of equal
protection in her concurrence. O’Connor saw the Texas statute as unconstitutional
because it targeted homosexuals, as opposed to the statute in question in Bowers, which
was universally intended.70 O’Connor agreed with Kennedy’s holding, but disagreed with
his reasoning and argued that Bowers should not have been overturned.
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Justice O’Connor applied strict scrutiny in her concurring opinion in Lawrence.
O’Connor’s concurrence exemplifies the use of strict scrutiny analysis in a case involving
same sex relationships. The Equal Protection Clause is extensively discussed by Justice
O’Connor not just in light of Bowers but with an eye to the future for same sex marriage.
While the decision itself is based on due process, Lawrence v. Texas contains explicit
language about the relationship between same sex marriage and the Equal Protection
Clause. O’Connor describes the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause, hinting at an
outlet for expanding the rights of homosexuals through the strict scrutiny standard of
review. While it may seem fairly obvious that suspect classification is the most clear
legal path to the legalization of same sex marriage, never before had that sentiment been
expressed explicitly in the legal precedent of the Supreme Court. While O’Connor
practically describes a point-by-point support of suspect classification of homosexuals,
she stops short of endorsing same sex marriage. In fact, she notes that a prohibition on
same sex marriage could be legitimized by the Court if a state put forth an effective
reason. Despite these confusing “hints,” Lawrence is far more significant for its same sex
marriage implications than for its fairly predictable response to Bowers.71 O’Connor’s
concurrence is the most blatant support for suspect classification of homosexuals in legal
history.
Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence is equally forceful in it’s dismissal of suspect
classification of homosexuals. In his dissent in both Romer and Lawrence, Justice Scalia
provided an argument regarding the three-tiered test for suspect classification and its lack
of support for homosexuality as such a class. Scalia does not designate homosexuals as a
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class because he believes that homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic but a
lifestyle choice. Scalia argues that the gay rights movement demonstrates that gays have
ample (if not disproportionate) access to political power. Failure on two of the three tiers
of the test for suspect classification does not warrant the protection of homosexuals as a
class, according to Scalia.
While Kennedy and O’Connor disagree on the method of reasoning, their
opinions distinguish between the criminalization of sexual conduct and the recognition of
the relationship in which it takes place. Justice Scalia makes no such distinction in his
dissent. Scalia argues that the Lawrence opinion “dismantles the structure of
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”72 While
Scalia exaggerates, he touches on an interesting point which is essential to this thesis.
Scalia sees the right to privacy and negative liberty as fundamentally interconnected to
the recognition of a relationship by the state. He argues that, after Lawrence eliminates
the right of the state to interfere in sexual conduct, there is no justification for denying
recognition of homosexual relationships. I wholly agree. While Scalia and I seek opposite
conclusions, our methods are similar.
In Lawrence, the Court held that the Texas statute violated the right to privacy
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Kennedy stated that “the
petitioners are entitled to their private lives…Their right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government.”73 The implications of this holding on the question of same sex marriage are
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complicated. The Lawrence decision solidified homosexuals’ privacy protection by the
Court. With privacy linked so closely to marriage in cases like Meyer, Skinner, Loving,
and Griswold, I build on Scalia’s Lawrence dissent. I argue that case precedent
articulates the fundamental right for a homosexual to marry- and for the private aspects of
that marriage to be protected and the public recognition of it acknowledged by the state.
The following chapter describes this argument.

48

Chapter Four
In Support of Same Sex Marriage

The existing case law regarding issues of marriage, privacy and same sex
relationships demonstrates important aspects of the same sex marriage question. First,
cases like Meyer, Skinner, and Pierce demonstrate the fundamental right to marry.
Second, as Carlos Ball argues, there are both positive and negative liberties involved in
this fundamental right. Third, the Due Process Clause has been used to protect the liberty
of privacy for a long time, and the emerging protection of recognition is well established
in case precedent. Finally, the Court articulated in Lawrence v. Texas that the right to
privacy applies to intimate homosexual relationships. While these three points are crucial
to the case for same sex marriage, more is needed to complete my argument. This chapter
will expand on the argument that began in the previous section. I first describe the
importance of the fundamental right to marry to my argument, and by demonstrate briefly
that this right exists. Next, I address the due process considerations of the argument. This
section includes a discussion of positive and negative liberties involved in exercising the
right to marry, in terms of privacy and recognition. Finally, I discuss the contributions of
equal protection to the argument and several problems which arise when one considers
questions of equal application. What results is a demonstration that the Fourteenth
Amendment, with support of case precedent, protects the right for same sex couples to
marry.
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Part One: Suspect Classification - A Dead End Road to Strict Scrutiny
The degree of protection provided by the Court varies depending on the groups
and interests at stake. Strict scrutiny has traditionally been reserved solely for cases
involving discrimination against a suspect class of people, discrimination based on race.
A group qualifies as a suspect class if its defining characteristic is immutable, if there is a
history of discrimination against the group, and if access to legislative means of
representation is limited by discrimination. This three-tiered test is a difficult one to pass.
While to date only racial and ethnic groups have received the protection of strict scrutiny,
scholars like Albert and Feigen argue that sexual orientation is also a suspect
classification.
If sexual orientation were determined to be a suspect classification, it would place
a heavy burden of proof on the state to justify any discrimination against homosexuals,
including restricting their access to marriage. While strict scrutiny is a clear “goal” for
the case for same sex marriage, I do not believe that suspect classification is the best way
to achieve that goal.
The ambiguous and particular qualities of homosexuality render suspect
classification extremely problematic. First, it is difficult to say that sexual orientation is
an immutable characteristic. In other words, some people may be gay or lesbian by
choice and others because they feel it is a quality with which they were born. Whether or
not anyone is born with their sexual orientation pre-determined is yet to be determined.74
The possibility of a gay gene contributes more questions than answers to the issue of
immutability at this time.
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Furthermore, it is difficult to resolve even what constitutes homosexuality. Many
believe homosexual behavior, or gay sex, is what defines a person as homosexual. This is
exemplified in Justice Scalia’s Romer dissent. Others believe one’s sexual preferences are
part of their identity, either expressed or not.75 The disparity between the acts and identity
debate over homosexuality renders a conclusion about immutability virtually impossible.
Still, sexual orientation could be considered a suspect classification if the other
two tiers of the three tiered test can be demonstrated. The second, a history of
discrimination, needs little explanation. While there are individuals, like the makers of
the Report series of videos, who believe that homosexuals are not victims of
discrimination, most do. The frequent occurrence of hate crimes against gays like
Matthew Sheppard has made the case for a history of discrimination against gays and
lesbians.
While it is possible to demonstrate a history of discrimination, the final tier of the
three tiered test is a difficult hurdle to jump. In order to demonstrate that gay, lesbian and
bisexual people have limited access to legislative resources, it is necessary to argue
against the efficacy of powerful political action organizations like the Human Rights
Campaign and even homosexual political leaders like New Jersey’s former Governor
James McGreevy. Justice Scalia commented in Romer, “Because those who engage in
homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities,
have high disposable incomes and, of course, care about homosexual rights issues much
more ardently than the public at large, they possess political power greater than their
numbers.”76 While Scalia’s comments are sweeping generalizations, it is true that there
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are many means by which gay and lesbian causes can be promoted at the legislative level.
While it could be argued that African Americans also have powerful legislative
advocacy, the case for racial immutability is arguably much stronger than is the case for
homosexual immutability. As a result, I cannot safely demonstrate that sexual orientation
qualifies for suspect classification to the same degree as race, securing strict scrutiny
analysis.

Part Two: The Road Less Traveled – The Fundamental Right to Marry
Luckily, since Skinner, another path to strict scrutiny exists. The fundamental
nature of the right to marry has been demonstrated in the cases of Meyer, Pierce and
Skinner. Over time, the Court has asserted the difference between those rights that are
fundamental and other rights. Until Skinner, the importance of this qualification of rights
was ambiguous. In Skinner, Justice Douglas explained that the Court was “dealing… with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.”77 Because the right to
marry was fundamental, the Court applied a high level of scrutiny to the legislation, strict
scrutiny. Strict scrutiny placed a heavy burden of proof on the state to demonstrate that
the legislation was directly related to a legitimate government interest.
Following Skinner, the violation of fundamental rights was consistently granted
strict scrutiny by the Court. “The Court has continuously held that marriage is a
fundamental right that may be deprived only if the government has a compelling
purpose.”78 Such a compelling purpose has never been demonstrated. Indeed, the Court
has reaffirmed the precedent of Meyer, Pierce and Skinner in many Fourteenth
77
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Amendment cases, including Loving, Zablocki and Turner. The fundamental right to
marry is firmly rooted in case precedent.
The precedent described in the previous chapter does more than validate the
fundamental right to marry, however. Cases like Griswold, Loving and Turner
demonstrate the nature of this right. The fundamental right to marry is composed of
different liberties, both positive and negative.

Part Three: The Liberties Involved in the Right to Marry
The right to marry is unique because it involves both privacy and recognition. The
right to marital privacy has accompanied the right to marry since Meyer. Skinner is the
first significant case which hinged on the right to marital privacy. Following Skinner was
Griswold, which also affirmed the right to marital privacy. These cases “which are
primarily (and necessarily) focused on the negative obligations of the state, [depended], if
only implicitly, on the prior positive steps taken by the state to recognize certain
relationships as marital.”79 An attempt to separate the positive and negative liberties
involved in the right to marry is therefore difficult. Privacy, in the cases of Skinner and
Griswold, would be irrelevant if the state refused to recognize the relationship in which
the private behavior took place. And so, in marital privacy cases, the negative liberty
relies on the positive liberty. There is marital privacy because there is marriage, not the
other way around.
Marital privacy was extended to homosexual couples in Lawrence. Observing the
connection between positive and negative liberties of marriage, therefore, an interesting
argument arises. It is necessary to grant state recognition of same sex relationships
79
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because the privacy practiced therein is dependent upon state recognition. In recognizing
privacy rights, the state must grant recognition. While this argument may seem
complicated and slightly illogical, there is a significant body of case law to support the
idea that positive and negative liberties in the right to marry are interconnected.
Beginning with the case of Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), the right to privacy has
been extended beyond the marital bedroom.80 Cases like Eisenstadt and Lawrence
demonstrate that the right to privacy in an intimate relationship extends beyond marriage
into heterosexual and homosexual relationships, protecting the right to intimate conduct
without being penalized. These cases use Meyer, Skinner and Griswold as support for the
right to intimate privacy. Not until 2003 was that right extended to homosexual couples
in Lawrence.
Lawrence was especially significant for its contributions to the connection
between negative and positive liberty. Justice Kennedy “distinguished between the ability
of the state, consistent with the Constitution, to criminalize same-gender sexual conduct,
and the obligation of the state to recognize same-sex relationships.”81 In making such a
distinction, Kennedy alludes to the two part liberty associated with marriage. However,
Kennedy does not recognize the significant evidence which connects the positive and
negative liberties involved in the right to marry. “Justice Kennedy was incorrect when he
implied in his majority opinion in Lawrence that there is (always) an important
distinction between state interference with intimate relationships on the one hand and
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state recognition of those relationships on the other.”82 While Kennedy’s distinction may
be correct for many private decision (like the decision to end a pregnancy), marriage
stands as an important exception.
While the privacy of intimate conduct and the recognition of the intimate
relationship in which it takes place are different, these two liberties are linked in the case
of marriage. Kennedy’s opinion states that sodomy statutes “seek to control a personal
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”83 Kennedy
acknowledges that same sex relationships may be entitled to state recognition, as are
marital relationships. By connecting the privacy of non-marital conduct to the recognition
guaranteed to married, heterosexual relationships, the Lawrence majority directly
confronts the question of same sex marriage. While he does not advocate for this
recognition, the Lawrence opinion discusses liberty in a way that contributes to an
argument for the state recognition of same sex relationships.
Lawrence v. Texas could have been decided with a more specific and less
controversial opinion. The statute in question prohibited same sex intimate conduct,
specifically targeting homosexuals. The Court had merely to acknowledge that the right
to privacy extended beyond marital relationships and deem the statute unconstitutional.
However, “the Court was unwilling to limit its understanding of the liberty interests at
issue in the case to considerations of special privacy.”84 Kennedy’s opinion presents a
conception of liberty that is composed of negative and positive elements. Kennedy
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presets this expansive understanding of liberty when discussing the constitutionality of
Bowers v. Hardwick.
The Bowers Court determined that the constitutional issue in question was
“whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy.”85 In response to this assertion, Kennedy describes the complexity of
the real constitutional question:
[The Bowers Court] discloses its own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at
stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim of the individual put forward, just as it would demean a
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse86.
The liberty interests at stake in Lawrence, therefore, extended beyond the right to
privacy and into the realm of respect and acceptance. Kennedy went beyond the
necessary ruling to elaborate on the importance of respecting same sex relationships.
Liberties like respect and acceptance cannot be placed in either the negative or positive
camp. The willingness of the Court to recognize them, however, alerts us to several
important points.
First, the Court is moving away from a limited understanding of the nature of
same sex relationships. Second, Lawrence serves as precedent promoting respect and
acceptance of same sex relationships. This acceptance may extend beyond mere tolerance
of the intimate conduct involved in such relationships. Finally, the Court has again
contributed to the precedent which blurs the line between negative and positive liberties,
adding same sex relationships to the discussion. These are important considerations in the
case for same sex marriage, but there are still some unanswered questions.
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In this section, I have demonstrated the connectedness of the positive and
negative liberties in the right to marry. I have explained that the recognition of marriages
precedes and necessarily establishes the right to marital privacy. Since Lawrence, same
sex relationships are entitled to the same privacy as marital relationships. Because of the
dependence of marital privacy on acknowledgement by the state, privacy rights are not
entirely separate from the right to state recognition. Lawrence connected homosexual
couples to the right to marry by granting them the right to marital privacy.
Is it necessary to recognize same sex relationships simply because they share the
same negative liberties as married relationships? No. But it is unconstitutional to keep the
right to recognition from same sex couples. The reasoning in this claim is two fold and
involves the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
the following two sections, several questions are posed. First, “Are positive liberties
protected by the Constitution in the case of marriage?” Next, “Do these positive liberties
of the fundamental right to marry apply to same sex couples?” Finally, “Are there any
compelling reasons not to recognize some homosexual relationships as marital?” I argue
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the recognition of some same sex relationships
as marital.

Part Four: Due Process and the Protection of Liberty
The Constitution protects the recognition of marriages as a liberty under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The positive liberty of recognition has
emerged alongside privacy rights in the body of case law surrounding same sex marriage.
In Loving v. Virginia, the Court asserted that “Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of
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man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom
on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes… is
surely to deprive all the States’ citizens of liberty without due process of law.”87 While
the Loving opinion responded to racial classifications, not sexual orientation
classifications, a parallel can be drawn between the Lovings and homosexual couples
wishing to marry.
In the Loving opinion, the Court acknowledged the role recognition plays in the
fundamental right to marry. If recognition were not a part of the fundamental right to
marry, the case for the Lovings would not have been as powerful. For the first time, with
the Loving decision, the Court recognized the importance of the marital relationship
beyond considerations of privacy. The Court concluded that “the denial of [recognition],
that is, the failure of the state to act, violated the claimants’ fundamental right to
marry.”88 Loving is, therefore, powerful precedent demonstrating that the fundamental
right to marry is incomplete without state recognition.
Zablocki strengthened this precedent. Similar to Loving, the Zablocki decision
focused primarily on equal protection, not due process. However, the Court indicated that
the state violated the rights of the petitioners in keeping the right to marry from them
solely because of their financial status. This decision further confirms that the
fundamental right to marry involves more than negative liberties. It involves an element
of recognition. When that recognition is kept from citizens without legitimate reason, the
state violates the right to marry. Zablocki expands the precedent set with Loving, granting
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Court protection of the right to marry to non-minority groups. After Zablocki, one need
not be a racial minority in order to command Court protection.
Still, Zablocki and Loving were both equal protection cases and do not focus
solely on the liberty interests involved in the right to marry. “It could be argued that
whatever positive obligation on the state to recognize marriage that can be gleaned from
[these cases] is primarily based on equal protection considerations rather than on
substantive due process grounds.”89 However, the Turner decision was based entirely on
due process grounds. The Equal Protection Clause had no role in the decision.
Importantly, nor did the right to privacy. Because the inmates in Turner had little to no
private lives and were not an established minority, the Court found reason to protect the
right to marry exclusive of negative liberties and equal protection considerations. Justice
O’Connor explained that the state was obligated to recognize the “important attributes of
marriage [that] remain… after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life.”
Among these important attributes are “expressions of emotional support and public
commitment… spiritual significance,” all of which are elements of the fundamental right
to marry.90
The cases of Loving, Zablocki and Turner provide evidence with which to answer
the first question required by my argument: Is the liberty of recognition protected by the
Constitution? Yes, it is. Indeed, the right to marry exists beyond and exclusive from the
right to sexual privacy and is protected by the Constitution in cases like Loving, Zablocki
and Turner.
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Part Five: Equal Protection - Liberty and Justice for All
Given the right to recognition of one’s marriage exists, the case for same sex
marriage develops. However, more questions remain. Does this protected liberty of
recognition apply to same sex couples? In order to answer this question, I turn to the
Equal Protection Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause requires a level of scrutiny by the Court dependent
upon the discrimination in question. Skinner established that the violation of a
fundamental right warrants the strictest scrutiny on the part of the Court. Because
marriage is a fundamental right and the positive liberty element of that right is violated
when homosexuals are not granted state recognized marriage, discrimination against
them requires strict scrutiny analysis.
Such an analysis demands that the statute in question be substantially related and
necessary for the accomplishment of a state objective, or a compelling state interest. It
follows that the protected liberty of recognition in the right to marry must be granted to
homosexual couples unless a compelling reason not to can be demonstrated by the state.
According to Justice O’Connor, “Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations-the
asserted state interest in [Lawrence] - other reasons exist to promote the institution of
marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.”91
What, then, constitutes a compelling reason to violate a fundamental right? What
legitimate reasons might there be to grant equal protection of positive liberty to
homosexual couples? A frequently argued reason to keep marriage from same sex
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couples is that marriage, by definition, is reserved for heterosexual unions only.92 This
claim addresses two important elements of those arguments against same sex marriage.
First, this claim inspires the perception of an articulated definition of marriage and
second, the belief that marriage is founded in a historical tradition greater and more
powerful that the principles of law upon which the United States was founded.
The idea that marriage is defined as a union between one man and one woman is
unsupported by legislative history. Congress has recognized the flexibility of the term
when “during the codification of the ban on gays in the military, it included a provision
excluding people in homosexual marriages.”93 The perceived necessity of this provision
demonstrates that there is ambiguity about the definition of marriage. Furthermore,
fifteen states have amended their constitutions to clarify the definition of marriage as a
heterosexual union, revealing the absence of a foundational definition of “marriage.”
If semantics may not be a compelling reason to violate the fundamental right to
marry, so many argue that a historical tradition of heterosexual marriage acts as reason
enough to limit this right. Many critics of same sex marriage fail to recognize that
“marriage is an evolving institution, and like many institutions, generational changes
result in new interpretations.”94 Among these new interpretations include the recognition
that wives are not property, that individuals of different races are capable of loving one
another, and that marital relationships constitute much more than an opportunity to
reproduce.
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The inability to recognize the fluid notion of marriage leads to the claim that
marriage is the foundation of the human race, that procreation is the primary goal of
marital unions, and that homosexual relationships have no way of achieving this goal.95 If
these were compelling reasons to keep the right to marry from homosexuals, it must be
kept from the impotent, sterile and aged members of our society as well.96 Clearly,
procreation is not a compelling reason to outlaw same sex marriage.
Definitions, history and procreation are not legitimate reasons to limit the
fundamental right to marry. Thus, moral disapproval and fear constitute the remaining
argument. The Court established in Lawrence that “moral disapproval [is not] a
legitimate state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not
heterosexual sodomy.”97 The Court, therefore, should not recognize disapproval as a
legitimate reason to limit the fundamental right to marry. Without the criminalization of
homosexual conduct upon which to fall back, opponents of same sex marriage, Justice
Scalia comments on the lack of any legitimate reason to limit the right to marry only to
heterosexuals. He states,
[Lawrence] dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a
distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal
recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexuals is ‘no
legitimate state interest’… what justification could there possibly be for denying the
benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising ‘the liberty protected by the
Constitution?98
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No compelling reasons exist to keep the recognition of marital relationships from
homosexual couples. The promotion of a definition which does not exist is not a
sufficient reason to limit fundamental rights. A bare desire to harm homosexuals or the
adherence to a history remembered incorrectly do not constitute are inadequate
arguments. Finally, moral disapproval does not suffice to legitimize discrimination of any
kind. The state, therefore, must recognize same sex relationships as marital.
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Chapter Five
Conclusion

This thesis has made a case for same sex marriage. My argument depends upon
the development of case precedent which demonstrates a fundamental right to marriage,
the emergence of positive and negative liberties associated with that right, and the
inclusion of homosexuals under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
fundamental right to marry has been violated. Fundamental rights are granted strict
scrutiny protection under the law and so, the right to marry requires strict scrutiny
protection by the Court. Following such an analysis, it is clear that there are no legitimate
reasons to keep state recognition of marriages from homosexual unions. The Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution does indeed protect the right of same sex couples to
marry.
This argument takes a place within a great body of scholarship devoted to the
topic of same sex marriage. While many have argued in support, I have found that most
of these arguments focus on either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection
Clause, rarely both. My argument is unique because it presents a comprehensive
approach to the Fourteenth Amendment. I believe that mine is the clearest, safest path
towards legalizing same sex marriage. My argument brings advocates of same sex
marriage one step further towards achieving their full right to marriage.
While my argument is unique, the line of reasoning I have presented is not the
only method of argument available. Suspect classification and undue burden are other
approaches to the Fourteenth Amendment that could arguably defend same sex marriage.
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My objections to the use of suspect classification, primarily the unreliability of the
immutability standard, have been outlined in the thesis. A brief analysis of the undue
burden test is necessary.
The undue burden test, like the strict scrutiny standard, aids the Court in deciding
whether or not a right has been violated. The standard was first presented in a joint
opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.99
Casey challenged the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania abortion statute which placed
several restrictions on abortions in the state. The Court was asked to rule on five of these
provisions. Among them was the requirement of married women to inform their husbands
of their choice to abort. In a joint opinion written by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and
Souter, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of several of the provisions but
determined that “the provision requiring spousal notice violated the due process clause by
imposing an undue burden on a woman's abortion rights.”100
In effect, the “undue burden” standard allowed the Court to carefully dissect the
statute based on questions beyond concepts like fundamental rights. Much of the opinion
focused on the nature of choice, a woman’s liberty in terms of abortion. The result was
the simultaneous affirmation of Roe v. Wade, rejection of certain anti-abortion provisions,
and the limiting of other reproductive freedom. The nuance of this standard renders it
much more flexible than other standards of constitutional review, namely that of strict
scrutiny. This flexibility presents the undue burden test as an interesting and promising
path for the legalization of same sex marriage. My choice to focus on the strict scrutiny
standard of review, therefore, requires a defense.
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By comparing the undue burden and strict scrutiny standards, their relative
advantages become clear. It has been said that, where the undue burden test acts as a
scalpel, strict scrutiny is a sledgehammer.101 The former allows for precision and restraint
and the latter demands sweeping application. It follows that any court with an interest in
judicial restraint would prefer to apply the standard of undue burden to test the
constitutionality of a statute. However, I believe any counsel with an interest in securing
the most powerful decision to their client’s favor would surely request strict scrutiny
review of their case. In constructing this thesis, I wore the hat of counsel, not jurist. I
chose to argue for strict scrutiny over undue burden because of the power of the
precedent it sets.
Abortion cases, currently in the spotlight for the undue burden test, demonstrate
the failures of the standard. The Court, in Casey, pointed out that their decision marked
the sixth time in a decade that Roe had been challenged. Because of the controversial
nature of the abortion question, endless attacks on Roe v. Wade have been presented to
the Court. Many have succeeded. Since Roe, the right to choose has been dissected into
state-by-state statutes. Today, it is illegal for a rape victim to seek an abortion in South
Dakota and women in Minnesota are required to read several pamphlets about the lives of
the unborn before the procedure. When such statutes are continuously created and
challenged, the Court becomes the battlefield for a never-ending political and social
controversy. I believe that, were the undue burden test applied to anti-same sex marriage
statutes, a similar situation would result.
Despite the current chaos that is abortion legislation, however, it is the foundation
of a powerful and sweeping Court decision which has kept the right to abortion fairly safe
101
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for over thirty years. While Roe has been challenged repeatedly, it has been upheld
consistently. Without the powerful precedent set by Roe, I argue that the situation for
abortion rights would be worse than it is today. The same is true for the same sex
marriage question. As an advocate for same sex marriage, I find that the undue burden
test is acceptable only when it is preceded by a stronger standard. Because legal same sex
marriage would attract challenges and attacks, a strong standard must be set in order to
limit political manipulation of the Court.
The right to same sex marriage will continue to be violated and attacked. Some
are convinced that the prospect of legalized same sex marriage will remain a figment in
the imaginations of civil rights advocates and legal scholars like me for years to come.
Without a commitment to the letter of the law on the parts of the justices of the United
States Supreme Court, it may be that there is little hope for the future of same sex
marriage. Such objectivity becomes increasingly difficult in the today’s political
atmosphere.
I remain, however, an optimist. There are many avenues of legal reasoning which
end at same sex marriage. Mine is merely one such argument. I intend it to stand strong
in the face of imposing challenge. While the future of liberal politics is arguably grim,
and the insufficient justifications for limiting fundamental rights remain popular rhetoric,
I will forever be a lover of the Constitution and its promise of equality and justice for all.
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